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Foreword
 
I have read with great interest this study of the Norwegian Institute of Inter-
national Affairs (NUPI). I would recommend it for careful consideration by
diplomats and experts involved in arms control, non-proliferation and disar-
mament issues. I am a stong believer that effective verification could pave the
road to increased confidence in disarmament treaties, in particular related to
weapons of mass destruction.
Inpsections are a vital tool in international agreements that seek to minimize
the potential of conflict or threats to international or regional peace and secu-
rity. While States prepare and train continuously for the event of war, by
comparison, the effort devoted to preparing for peace is infinitesimally small.
Moreover, being prepared for peace and disarmament is critical. Trained
international experts who can be ready and prepared for their tasks would be
a great asset for the international community.
This study is an important step in this direction. Sustaining and furthering
the knowledge base, common understandings and harmonized approaches
can have enormous benefit. Planning for disarmament is not an idealistic
dream.
Sergio Duarte
United Nations
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
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Preface
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have been and will continue to be a
dominant threat to international security. The international community
has, through a combination of skill, dogged hard work and a measure of
luck, contained WMD threats. Such efforts will need to continue for the fore-
seeable future.
 
In the course of the preceding three decades, various weapons inspection
regimes have been created—mainly as integral elements of international arms
control and disarmament treaties, or other agreements aimed at controlling
conflict. These regimes have varied in mandate, context and scope, but share
many techniques, procedures, and key dynamics. Many of them are related to
WMD, the most devastating weaponry ever created and deployed.
Despite this track record, surprisingly little has been distilled and recorded
from the experience of the inspectors who carried out inspection activities or
the diplomats and politicians behind them. If it became necessary to set up a
WMD related inspection regime today, there is little central reference from
which to draw upon the experiences of previous cases.
This document sets out to begin to fill that gap. Benefitting from past cases,
it provides a general discussion of the important early decisions that must be
taken and indicates key areas where such decisions can have major immediate
and long term consequences. Diplomats and political leaders rarely come
from an arms control background, and thus frequently lack familiarity with
the concepts and practices of effective inspection procedures and techniques.
This document provides a practical introduction and highlights important
requirements, tradeoffs and pitfalls.
All types of potential WMD-related inspection regimes are covered, from
those carried out under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to bilateral and mul-
tilateral arrangements. Their objectives, mandates, inspection execution,
reporting and possible outcomes are discussed. The impact of likely techno-
logical advances on operations and procedures is also covered. This document
is intended to serve as a primary—non-political—source to be consulted
when an inspection regime is first considered.
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Creating an inspection regime in the midst of an international crisis is partic-
ularly fraught with difficulty. Political leaders can find it valuable to have a
recognized reference document on which to base and gauge their inspection
regime proposals and deliberations. There is inevitable tension between
inspection intrusiveness and confidence when weapon inspection activities
are due. . Debates over establishing the balance can be heated. This document
is intended to be a baseline reference to ground such discussions. Drawing on
the wisdom gained from inspection regimes in the past—and the wisdom of
those who made mistakes and subsequently recognized them as such—should
help diplomats avoid many of the unintended negative consequences that
befell earlier regimes. Compromise and judgment will always be required, but
the ability to refer to previous effective practice can only improve the out-
comes of such decisions.
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Executive Summary
 
Weapons inspections have been the central component in both international
arms control and disarmament treaties as well as a vital element in resolving
international conflicts.
Over the past three decades, inspection regimes have been used repeatedly in
diplomatic efforts to limit or end conflict and foster regional and global secu-
rity. Yet, these inspection regimes have often been created on an ad hoc basis,
without a credible standard reference system to guide politicians or diplomats.
There is no baseline source that enumerates the issues, practices and techniques
that must be considered when negotiating a new system of inspections.
Furthermore, there is no mechanism for collecting the knowledge and practi-
cal expertise of existing disarmament agencies and experienced weapons
inspectors. Such a resource would be a valuable aid for the international com-
munity and could inform future negotiators seeking to implement arms
inspections as part of conflict resolution efforts.
Finally, there is no international registry of individuals with experience and
expertise who could be called up to create, staff, or operate potential new
inspection systems.
 
Today, if a crisis related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) occurs, there
is no standard reference material or overarching framework document that
decision-makers can use to design new inspection regimes and/or equip them
with appropriate verification and inspection tools. Nor is there any roster of
qualified individuals who could be available for deployment for international
inspection activities. As things now stand, when diplomats and politicians
encounter a new crisis regarding WMD (or indeed some conventional weap-
ons such as man-portable anti-aircraft missiles) they must relearn and rein-
vent, for better or worse, the elements of other earlier regimes.
While the international community has addressed recent WMD crises, there
has been no effort to record systematically the lessons-learned from the weap-
ons inspectors involved. Those experiences can provide invaluable back-
ground information for future use.
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There also has been no coordinated analysis of these important inspections
regimes, for example in Iraq, to synthesize the common elements, dynamics
and technical aspects that can serve as a credible, 
 
non-political
 
, registry of
weapons inspection techniques and standards. Recent experience in Iraq also
demonstrates the massive costs of conflicts that could be avoided provided an
inspection regime can accomplish its objectives. Lessons from that expensive
experience in particular could hopefully better inform future decision-makers
and practitioners. One could note that the UN has sealed all files from Iraq,
thereby making relevant assessments of inspection quality and efficiency
unavailable for the next 60 years.
There may be instances where inspection systems associated with existing
arms control and disarmament regimes related to WMD can be re-evaluated
in light of the lessons from recent experiences. Some regimes have either
become moribund or are erroneously assumed to be capable of dealing with
all possible future events. Or they may not take advantage of new technologies
or information sources unheard of when they were created. One has only to
recall that the US-Soviet nuclear weapons agreements depended upon so-
called “National Technical Means” of verification—a euphemism for secret
reconnaissance satellites. Now Google Earth and commercial imagery satel-
lites provide a much higher level of transparency.
Diplomats and political leaders rarely come from an arms control back-
ground. Without such a background it is easy to misjudge and miscalculate
what is needed to implement effective arms control and disarmament regimes
or mandates. Moreover, it is likely that tensions will be extremely high when
such systems are created or modified. Trust will be at its lowest point and ele-
ments of any proposal will likely be suspected of political or malevolent
intent. Nevertheless, it is just at such moments when positive action can be
taken to reinvigorate counter-proliferation and disarmament efforts. An
unbiased, non-political, credible resource that can provide the foundational
information and contribute to building critical staff expertise could be a
major improvement to the international security environment—one that no
organization, not even the UN, currently offers.
In the fall of 2010, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
took the initiative to invite a select group of former weapon inspectors and
diplomats to Oslo to begin to discuss producing practical reference materials
for those who may face the future challenge of setting up and implementing
a new international inspection regime. In parallel, a range of interviews with
former weapons inspectors and key stakeholders were conducted. The result-
ing document sets out, briefly, the most important early decisions which have
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to be taken before any WMD inspection regime is set up—in particular by
the United Nations—and the implications of those choices.
All types of WMD inspections (though relevance to potential conventional
weapons inspection activities should be noted) are covered, from those carried
out under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to more cooperative arrangements
on a bilateral or a multilateral basis. Objectives, mandates, the conduct of
inspections, reporting, and possible outcomes are delineated.
Norway’s vision of progress in disarmament calls for committed international
leadership at the highest levels. NUPI’s initiative has been inspired by that
vision and could build momentum for further specific and implementable
steps. If this goes along, the international community will have at its disposal
a significant pool of qualified and well-prepared experts. Those who might be
identified and trained by this process would be committed to a vision of
advances in disarmament.
We therefore recommend that immediate action be taken to collect, record
and crystallize the inspection knowledge and insights gained at great cost over
the past decades. Specifically, we recommend that:
• The interview process with former and current weapons inspectors and
diplomats should continue, so that as many experts with rich inspection
experience from as many backgrounds and perspectives as possible can
be canvassed;
• The resulting document (and ultimately an on-line resource with an
assortment of related resources and databases) will develop to become a
living product to be updated and modified on a continuous basis to take
account of changing technologies, experiences and practices around the
world. It is envisioned that this could become the basis for an “effective
practices” compilation that would be carefully considered and reconsid-
ered by international experts;
• Also, the resulting documents would be taken as the guide for a training
program to prepare suitable candidates to participate in international
inspections. This effort would offer a pool of personnel trained to respond
to both existing and future global non-proliferation requirements;
• Attention is paid not only to the development of training, but also to
examining model inspection regimes, incorporating as many lessons
from existing and former institutions as possible.
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Norway is well placed to reach out to the widest scope and variety of stake-
holders and practitioners before the hard-won knowledge that currently exists
on the topic begins to fade away.
Norway has the resources, capacity and opportunity to establish a lessons-
learned reference for future inspection regimes and arrangements, as well as a
process to train future weapons inspectors.
Norway could be seen as a credible custodian of a registry of arms inspection
practices and resources. Such a repository would assist policy-makers and dip-
lomats in situations where weapons inspections systems can contribute to a
solution.
A pan-Scandinavian or another international approach might be suggested as
a wider platform for carrying out this process. Ultimately, the United Nations
may well be the host for the resulting product. In the final analysis, the world
community as a whole would benefit from the efforts with new and unique
tools for diplomacy and conflict resolution.
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I. Introduction
 
A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) may be defined as a weapon that is
capable of indiscriminant and large-scale destruction of people, infrastructure
and resources. WMD usually include nuclear, chemical, and biological weap-
ons. WMD are the subject of numerous international arms control, non-pro-
liferation and disarmament treaties in addition to political agreements, con-
ventions and other legal arrangements.
 
1.1. Weapons inspection
 
. States have been developing and deploying
WMD for nearly a century, whereas arms control, non-proliferation and
disarmament measures have lagged behind. Arms control agreements
inevitably focus on verification and inspections are regularly a key ele-
ment of verification; they build confidence in compliance. The more
comprehensive, thorough, and independent an inspection regime is, the
greater is its value in providing assurance that the parties are adhering to
any agreements. Depending on the circumstances of the agreement,
destruction of weapons and associated facilities may be included in an
inspection regime. It may also be the case that under certain circum-
stances political leaders seek to avoid the term “inspections” and use a
lighter term such as “fact-finding missions” or “visits.” The basic ele-
ments herein still apply.
 
1.2. Weapons inspection efficacy
 
. The deterrent value of a weapons inspec-
tion regime (its effectiveness in dissuading a party from cheating) is a
function of multiple factors. The party subject to inspection will make
decisions on compliance based on 
 
its
 
 
 
assessment of the probability of detec-
tion of violations coupled with its assessment of the potential cost (or penalty)
of being detected
 
. This is a risk-deterrent equation, and one that must be
taken into account at the outset by those creating an inspection regime.
Negotiators may design, and inspectors operate, a system that has a cer-
tain probability of detecting violations. However, the consequence (or
penalty) to a non-compliant party is in the hands of the supervisory
political body (e.g. the UN Security Council) constituting the inspec-
tion regime. Those creating a new weapons control mechanism must
consider these two aspects of the equation from the outset.
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1.3. Balancing considerations
 
. There is an inevitable tension between the
national security and sovereignty concerns of the inspected state, versus
the intrusiveness of the mandated inspections. This tension tends to dom-
inate the concerns of the drafters of a new regime. Drafters must consider
the balance between highly intrusive inspection techniques that can
increase the probability of detecting violations with the extent and certi-
tude of the penalties they will impose. A political evaluation of this balance
with respect to achieving the desired overall goals can only be achieved
through careful negotiation and assessment of the specific situation. (The
trade-off between protection of national security information and open-
ness for inspections was most recently seen in the negotiation of verifica-
tion measures between Russia and the United States for the new START
agreement on strategic nuclear forces. Of particular importance was access
to the telemetry data transmitted during ballistic missile test flights. Both
sides agreed to not encrypt data according to mutually agreed arrange-
ments. They traded sovereignty for the benefit of verification confidence.)
However, there are common dynamics and tradeoffs in all cases and a vari-
ety of historical inspection experiences should be reviewed for such situa-
tions. It may be noted that many of the skills and inspection techniques
can equally apply to non-WMD weapons inspection situations.
 
1.4. Relevant knowledge erodes
 
. Many of the practitioners who set up and
initially conducted inspection processes during the past few decades are
no longer active. Indeed, international weapons inspection activity has
declined in volume, though not importance. This drop does not imply
a sudden outbreak of world peace. There is a normal ebb and flow to
international security dynamics. US-Russia inspections have dimin-
ished. The Intermediate Nuclear Force agreement has successfully come
and gone. On the horizon may be new applications for weapons control
and inspection, such as in North Korea or Syria. Past practice and cau-
tion would suggest that the international community would do well to
prepare tools to contain future conflict and sustain the capacity to imple-
ment mechanisms for weapons control and inspections. However,
despite the wealth of past experience, there is no readily accessible repos-
itory available to inform the drafters of new regimes. Moreover, the pool
of experience is fragmented, anecdotal and perishable. This document
provides an introduction and guide to the construction of an inspection
system. The intent is to inform those creating future regimes so they do
not have to relearn the lessons of the past, and can avoid potentially
costly mistakes. Accompanying efforts to sustain a web-based database
as well as an international register of individuals with relevant skills and
experience are also planned.
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1.5. Purpose
 
. The objective of this document is to describe briefly the issues
and requirements political leaders and diplomats will need to have in
mind when considering a new verification or inspection regime, or when
authorizing a specific verification or confidence-building activity regard-
ing WMD. It is hoped that this will contribute to international norms,
standards or “best practices” in the field of weapons inspections. Further,
with sufficient international interest, there are opportunities to enhance
the international exchange of ideas, training, procedures, equipment,
and participation for future inspection activities.
 
1.6. Control regime – types and circumstances
 
. This document is relevant
for all types of potential WMD inspections--from those backed by the
threat of coercive action or sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter to more consensual arrangements between individual states.
 
1.7. Context of regime creation
 
. In the past, inspection regimes have been
created after lengthy debate, negotiations and careful consideration.
However, they have also been created suddenly during periods of great
international tension when objective baseline data have not been readily
accessible and much uncertainty dominates the situation. Consider a cri-
sis involving the alleged use, possession, stockpiling, research, and devel-
opment or testing of WMD. Policy-makers will attempt to bring the sit-
uation under control. This may occur under the aegis of an existing arms
control inspection agency or the UN Security Council. However, the
crisis may not be covered by existing arrangements and the diplomatic
venue might be that of a regional group of states pursuing bilateral or
multilateral negotiations. (For example, concerns about non-compliance
with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—which has no veri-
fication mechanism—were addressed in the trilateral agreement of
1990-1992. See below.) The principal objective may be to negotiate a
settlement that will seek to assess the numbers and types of weapons and
facilities involved, with a view to their control or elimination. Actions
taken in such a crisis may lead to the institution of long-lasting arms
control measures with unforeseen consequences—particularly if those
charged with this task have little or no knowledge of WMD or inspec-
tions. Former experts in whom such knowledge resides may not be con-
sulted, may not agree, or may be seen as politically biased. Moreover,
negotiations in such a highly charged political environment may occur
when trust is at a nadir. There are pressures for answers about the reli-
ability of verification and inspections measures. At the sudden conclu-
sion of the 1991 Gulf war, diplomats were unprepared to negotiate a
UN resolution that created the ceasefire and linked Iraq disarmament to
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lifting sanctions. The war ended before any serious post-conflict plan-
ning was done and diplomats at the Security Council were considering
draft measures with very little expertise. The resolution was not tem-
pered by realistic experience and for many participants—especially the
non-permanent members of the Security Council—they had no basis to
evaluate the importance of the measures proposed. Absence of credible
expertise can, and has, produced mistakes. Even seemingly small mis-
takes at the early stages of initiating arms control measures may have
long-term political consequences that undermine the whole process.
 
1.8. Illustrative cases of regime creation
 
.
 
A. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
 
. The Chemical Weapons Con-
vention is an example of a regime that was created following years of multi-
lateral negotiations. Elaborate verification procedures were established in con-
junction with the treaty limits. A very extensive and detailed Verification
Annex to the Convention was painstakingly drafted. As part of the collective
and mutually beneficial goal to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons,
states, by treaty, agreed to permit international inspection teams to engage in
strictly prescribed and monitored inspections of their facilities. This regime
came into being in 1997 after long diplomatic negotiations, and the inspec-
tion measures were preceded by trials and review—a deliberate and lengthy
process. A large international organization was established to implement the
convention—the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW). It is now located in The Hague with 500 staff persons and an
annual budget of roughly USD 100 million.
 
B. The Biological Weapons Trilateral Statement/Agreement of 1992
 
.
This is an example whereby a group of states (Russia, United Kingdom and
the United States) came together to resolve suspicions of ongoing clandestine
prohibited WMD associated activity. Suspicions touched upon research,
development, testing, manufacture, and stockpiling of biological weapons.
Working groups were created and inspections conducted as confidence build-
ing measures. This sensitive issue was handled through narrow diplomatic
channels and is a good example whereby a subset of parties to a treaty (in this
case the Biological Weapons Convention) created an ad hoc agreement to sat-
isfy grave concerns that included inspections as a key confidence building
measure. These circumstances may occur again among countries less prac-
ticed with arms control and inspection methodologies. (For example during
internal conflict in Sudan during the 1990’s, there were allegations of CW use
that could not be addressed within the context of local expertise.) The time
needed to set up appropriate arrangements will depend on the pressure in the
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political situation. However, as the scale and duration are likely to be limited,
the process may be agreed upon relatively quickly. The mechanism may have
a very low profile, being almost a private arrangement between states to
address an underlying issue. The prospects of confidence building or inspec-
tion activities related to the BWC recurring are significant because there is no
verification component of the treaty itself. Local or regional concerns are
likely to be addressed by similar ad hoc inspections.
 
C. Post-conflict Iraq in 1991 (UNSCR 687) and Germany 1919 (Ver-
sailles Treaty)
 
. Inspections may be triggered in the aftermath of conflict. As
part of a ceasefire or peace settlement, an inspection regime may be imposed
as a means of assessing compliance with disarmament terms or conditions.
Such regimes are coercive. These regimes may be intended to be of a fixed
duration, but in practice this has not been the case. In both cases the regimes
imposed upon the defeated party ended without achieving the intended
objectives—long-term disarmament. Political dynamics overtook the techni-
cal operations of the inspection groups. The collective objectives and will of
the states imposing the measures diverged over time and the inspectorates
were caught between powerful and diverging political forces. Nevertheless,
the disarmament accomplishments were substantial and the extraordinarily
intrusive techniques and tactics set new standards for inspections.
 
D
 
. 
 
UN investigations of chemical weapons use during the Iran-Iraq war
(1984-88)
 
.
An allegation of use of a particular WMD may also trigger an inspection.
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran requested that the UN Secretary General
investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. In 1984, after consultations
with Iraq, the Secretary General appointed an ad hoc group of (only) four spe-
cialists to travel to the region and conduct an investigation. Their inspections
led to a report to the Secretary General and the Security Council. Following
further allegations, the group was reconstituted for a second mission in 1986
at the height of the conflict. Again, the same medical and chemical specialists
conducted an inspection. The process was unprecedented and required
lengthy diplomatic exchanges when delays could result in the loss of vital evi-
dence, degrading the overall purpose. Nevertheless, the missions were valu-
able in the efforts to control the conflict by the United Nations.
 
E. Termination of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program
 
. Other situa-
tions could include the sudden change in political affairs of a state with
known or suspected WMD capacities. South Africa made a decision to elim-
inate its secret nuclear weapons capability in 1989 with the intention of sub-
sequently acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). South
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Africa conducted the dismantlement unilaterally and secretly until it
announced its intention to join the NPT in 1991. Subsequent inspections by
the IAEA confirmed the dismantlement of weapons and facilities. However,
because of the destruction of all materials and documents, there seems to be
some uncertainty regarding the origins of the program, and even the final dis-
position of the nuclear materials.
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II. Inspection Regime Framework
 
The objective and mandate of an inspection regime must be clearly defined if
it is to stand any chance of success. Given the environment in which such mat-
ters are often considered – frenetic diplomatic activity at all levels, military
action and great political pressure – identifying the parameters that affect the
intended regime and how they should be addressed is not easy. It is paramount
to the success of an inspection regime that the desired outcome will be clearly
understood and agreed by all parties. Once established, the objectives of the
inspection regime can be identified. In turn, this allows those planning the
process to break down the objectives into manageable tasks, each with its own
goals or aims. 
In parallel, a documented mandate (e.g. a UN Security Council resolution or
a bilateral agreement) will be formulated, which is the political expression of
the objectives of the inspection regime. The mandate becomes the legal justifi-
cation and framework under which the regime will operate. Lack of care in
the drafting of a mandate may result in failure to achieve the desired outcome.
Changing or making even minor adjustments to a mandate after it has been
agreed upon may be time-consuming at best and, in practice, nearly impossi-
ble. Thus, this early process is crucial.
 
2.1. The notion of weapon
 
. Although arms control inspections may encom-
pass any type of weapon, this document considers only those concerning
WMD, i.e. chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons.
For inspection purposes, the associated infrastructure may be included.
In addition, certain testing, manufacture, transport, and storage facilities
may have ‘dual-use’ status, i.e. they are not exclusively devoted to WMD.
These definitional aspects can drive much of the negotiating effort. Cre-
ating measures to cover these features can be very different depending
upon the objective. It thus follows that particular care must be taken to
define the objectives and boundaries of an inspection regime and to
incorporate appropriate measures that deal with dual-use materiel.
 
2.2. Objectives of inspection regimes
 
. Inspection regimes tailored to oper-
ate under specific conditions will require a deliberate set of objectives.
These may range from an agreement between states concerning mutual
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inspections (establishment of the presence or absence of specific weap-
ons, equipment or materiel), to highly intrusive measures such as the
complete destruction of the vital pieces associated with a specific pro-
gram. The objectives will necessarily depend on the political situation
and may be framed as part of any conflict-resolution measures. Alterna-
tively, the aim may be to resolve specific concerns about an isolated sus-
pected use of a prohibited weapon. A process may also be designed as a
continuing confidence building measure in support of an arms control
and disarmament agreement, requiring long-term monitoring and
inspections on a strictly prescribed basis. Finally, the objective may be to
attach a supplementary measure to an existing regime, designed to
improve or extend what is already in place. For example, the trilateral
agreement mentioned above negotiated and implemented inspections to
verify compliance with the existing BWC.
 
2.3. Handling non-compliance
 
. From the outset, it must be clear what is
meant by “non-compliance.” This will require an unambiguous descrip-
tion in the mandate that will drive the scope and nature of reporting pro-
vided by the inspectorate. Strong, consistent leadership at all levels of the
decision-making process and regular consultations with all parties will
also help to avoid unnecessary crises over differing interpretations of com-
pliance. An understanding of what constitutes non-compliance needs to
be reinforced with an equally good understanding of the available likely
response to specific violations. Any untoward event or occurrence must be
met with a proportionate response. There is inevitable ambiguity at these
junctures since minor issues of compliance may or may not be important.
The resulting difficulty is that there may be no proportional response
(penalty) to suit seemingly small infractions. For example, inspectors may
arrive at a site with the expectation of being permitted entry within some
standard period of waiting time. If the host government delays the inspec-
tors by an hour, does that constitute non-compliance? If so, what propor-
tional penalty can the supervisory body apply? Such delays can, in fact,
make a substantial difference in assuring compliance.
 
2.4. Scope of inspection activity
 
. Any inspection regime requires the capa-
bility to obtain the information, or carry out the actions necessary to
achieve the goals set for it. This will vary according to the nature of those
goals. There is a tradeoff between the concerns for national sovereignty/
security and the intrusiveness of inspections. This tradeoff can be con-
tentious depending upon the type of information deemed necessary to
support the desired outcome of the regime. Drafters need to be aware of
the problems that inspectors may encounter after implementing seem-
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ingly simple measures such as interviewing program personnel. While it
may be desirable to have a standardized approach to these matters, a
pragmatic solution developed on the spot may satisfy the inspection
goals. Similarly, issues can arise concerning the access of inspectors to
facilities, the documents they may ask for, the ability to collect samples,
and the use of particular technologies. Such practicalities need to be con-
sidered when the scope of the regime is being established.
 
2.5. The mandate
 
. Nothing can be achieved without a well thought-out
political and legal mandate for the action plans of the inspectorate. Mis-
takes or unresolved ambiguities can jeopardize the entire undertaking.
The mandate should be a compelling, positive statement designed to
elicit political support. It should be tailored closely to the agreed require-
ments. Attention to technical detail and definitions is required; impreci-
sion may cause the process to falter at a later stage.
 
2.6. Burden of proof
 
. This is a critical issue that must be addressed in the
mandate. Depending upon the objectives of the regime, it should set out
who has the responsibility to prove compliance – the inspected party, the
inspectors, or a supervisory body. For example, in the case of Iraq, the
Security Council clearly indicated that it was Iraq’s responsibility to ver-
ifiably declare the extent of its WMD program. It was the inspectors’
task to verify those declarations. Thus the burden of proof was on the
inspected party—Iraq. Lack of clarity on this point can put the inspec-
torate in an untenable position when disputes arise.
 
2.7. The role of the chairman/inspectorate chief
 
. The document should
clearly define the role of the inspectorate and particularly its chief exec-
utive. The question of whether the head of the inspectorate is expected
to offer assessments of compliance or only collect and report facts is a
vital subject of concern. Of course, much depends on the status, expe-
rience, and knowledge of the individual selected to head the inspection
activity. It will be up to the inspectorate chief to assess the task and
report to the body to which he is responsible (e.g. the Security Council
in the case of the UN). The creators of a new regime may choose a head
of the inspection agency even before they have solidified the mandate
and other instruments of implementation. This could allow the incum-
bent to help shape the process that will be his or hers to implement.
Incorporating the perspective of the inspectorate’s head at the forma-
tive stage may be beneficial in assuring that the regime can be imple-
mented in practice.
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2.8. Establishing modus operandi of inspections
 
. The first report of the
newly instituted inspectorate is crucial. It will contain the inspecting
body’s interpretation of the mandate, in effect defining the 
 
modus oper-
andi
 
 for its activities. As a practical matter, anybody involved should rec-
ognize that initial inspections set critical precedents. These include
agreements on: a clear operational definition of an achievable outcome,
how progress is to be reported, funding arrangements, how the body is
to be staffed, and many other administrative and logistical issues. As
time goes on, it will become increasingly difficult to expand the intru-
siveness or otherwise enlarge the practices of both inspectors and the
inspected party. The periodicity and content of reports to the supervi-
sory body will quickly establish a pattern that will tend to become rigid
in form.
 
2.9. Regime life
 
. The mandate should not only provide a clear definition of
what is to be investigated, but also specify the circumstances under which
the process is to be terminated or (radically) changed. Relevant details
may not emerge until the agency has delivered its first report to the party
that commissioned the inspection. This report should encompass specif-
ics of both the overall inspection objective and the type of inspection and
verification procedures envisaged. Consideration should be given to the
possibility of changes to the objective during this process: how can
changes be introduced, which mechanisms are available for this, and what
sort of consensus may be required. In anticipation of the termination of
the inspection regime, consideration should be given to the final report-
ing and the definitive disposal of archives and material collected.
 
2.10.Resources and funding
 
. Creating a new regime cannot be accomplished
without making an accompanying decision on providing the resources
necessary for the inspectorate to accomplish its mission. Realistic esti-
mates of funding requirements can be made through comparison with
ongoing inspection organizations (e.g. OPCW) and the experience from
previous groups such as United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspec-
tion Commission. (UNMOVIC). Costs for a deployed inspector in the
field with all support can be modeled, as can the expenses associated with
headquarters essentials, data handling, communications, and such ingre-
dients as overhead imagery and aircraft services. Consideration may also
be made for possible in-kind contributions by some supporting govern-
ments. (For example, the German and later the Chilean government pro-
vided helicopter support to UNSCOM operations in Iraq.) The vital
point is to not underestimate the true costs of the regime.
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2.11
 
.
 
Future requirements and accounts
 
. A key function of the inspection
organization is to project its future requirements and account for its
expenditures. The inspection agency should not (ideally) have the added
burden of soliciting contributions to carry out its mission. Instead, it
should be responsible only for providing estimates of the resources
needed. In addition to being an obstacle to the advancement of mission,
ad hoc arrangements for the provision of resources can carry political
consequences that may affect the real or perceived objectivity of the
inspection body. Should such arrangements be necessary, propriety calls
for experience and good judgment. (The UN Security Council did not
provide for funding of UNSCOM activities when UNSCOM was cre-
ated. Therefore, donations were the only source of resources and those
who donated tended to be those who had a direct interest in keeping Iraq
contained, namely the US and the Gulf States.)
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The head of a newly created inspection regime must arrange for many guide-
lines on fundamental issues within a very short period. Internal guidelines for
the inspectorate operations will be required as well as procedural guidelines
agreed upon with the inspected party.
 
3.1. Legal framework
 
. The mandate, whatever its form, is the basis on
which derivative inspection procedures are set. Subsidiary documents
will likely be required to establish privileges and immunities of inspec-
tions staff, aircraft flight clearance procedures, landing rights, and other
operational guidelines. An evolution of legal structures should be antic-
ipated. Creation of the mandate must take account of the legal practice
of all the parties involved, including those of existing international dis-
armament organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW.
 
3.2. Relationship with the inspected state
 
. There must be clear lines of
communication with the inspected state. A key determinant of how well
inspections will be conducted is the relationship between the inspected
state’s representatives on the ground and the inspectors themselves. At
one end of the spectrum, the process may be entirely consensual. Inspec-
tors may be following an invitation voluntarily offered by the inspected
state (e.g. in 2003 when Qaddafi invited inspections in connection with
Libya’s decision to end nuclear and CW programs, or the normal IAEA
inspections in countries party to the NPT). At the opposite end, the
inspections may be imposed on a state hostile to any such operation,
requiring an intrusive approach (as in the inspections in Iraq). The way
in which an inspection process operates will be affected at every point by
the nature of this relationship. Reporting on these relations to the super-
visory body must be transparent to the inspected state with regard to
both positive and negative aspects.
 
3.3. Information
 
. Inspections are scheduled or triggered either in reaction to
information received or in pursuit of information needed by the inspec-
torate. Information may come from open sources, secret intelligence, or
a third party on a confidential basis, for instance a commercial company.
(For example, UNSCOM was provided information about material
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exported commercially to Iraq that was ultimately used in its BW pro-
gram. This provided the critical clue in revealing the program’s exist-
ence.) The information may also derive directly from the inspected state
in the form of a declaration or similar document. Information may take
various forms: physical evidence such as weapon remains, witness state-
ments, documents or electronic media, aerial imagery, reports of
patients’ symptoms, or samples of suspect substances. Critical decisions
are necessary concerning information access and dissemination. States
are more willing to be open and share sensitive information the less
broadly it is shared. This inverse relationship needs to be balanced by the
head of the inspection body since the credibility of the inspectorate is a
function of its transparency.
 
3.4. Intelligence and transparency
 
. International agencies are often nervous
about handling “intelligence” information and tend to shy away from
any process that resembles the work of an intelligence organization.
However, it is impossible to avoid the need to use and collect confiden-
tial information when carrying out weapons inspections. In essence,
inspections are entirely about information; without a flow of informa-
tion, there will be no inspection. Tough issues such as whether all infor-
mation will be shared with all involved countries (or even all inspectors)
need to be addressed. Further, the question of whether information
about the inspected state is shared with any other country is critical and
needs to be evaluated at the start. The ideal approach is to adopt clear,
well-documented procedures that are standardized. Consideration of
practices under other conditions (such as the methods used by the UN
Department of Safety and Security) can provide a useful guide.
 
3.5. Information “fishing.”
 
 Inspectors are commonly accused of “fishing”
for information, or worse, that they are “spying.” Procedures should be
drafted with this in mind. It is vital to build into the system a series of
checks and balances to ensure that inspectors can avoid compromising
situations open to misinterpretation.
 
3.6. Irrelevant information
 
. Advances in computing, communications, and
data storage mean that the amount of information available to inspectors
is growing. Inspectors may unwittingly obtain sensitive information that
is quite irrelevant to the inspection process. Robust policies are necessary
to deal with information within the inspection process. Such policies
should address issues of handling, retention, confidentiality, commercial
and third party ownership, destruction, and storage.
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3.7. Agreements on sensitive information
 
. All parties must agree to proce-
dures for handling, access, storage, release, and final disposal of sensitive
and confidential material. This may be a contentious issue, especially
considering the degree of access by the inspected party to inspection
data. For example, Iraq desired, but was denied, access to much infor-
mation possessed by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC regarding suspected
WMD activities. Similar concerns may arise in the direction of third
parties, such as supporting laboratories, other states and agencies.
 
3.8. Balancing information
 
. The inspectorate chief will have to balance, on
the one hand, the need to protect information whose release might lead
to proliferation of illicit activities, against, on the other hand, the desire to
be seen acting in an open, even-handed, and transparent manner. The
importance of preserving human rights such as privacy and the safety and
security of personnel must also be heeded. Furthermore, the proprietary
nature of commercial information may need to be respected where it does
not directly involve a WMD program. Inevitably, the policies and practi-
cal pursuit of inspection objectives will involve a series of compromises.
 
3.9. Expert advice
 
. Any new inspection group will require specialized exper-
tise. Such advice must be timely, of high quality, and seen to be unbi-
ased. It should be anticipated that there would be an early requirement
for numerous experts drawn from around the world. Their role will be
to provide advice on the technical aspects of the inspection process and
ensure continuity, quality control and consistency. Such experts can
provide intellectual rigor and help to maintain technical correctness. It
may be possible to find such experts among the individuals already con-
tributing to existing inspection environments. States may be approached
to contribute suitable experts and/or it may prove possible to identify
and recruit individuals directly.
 
3.10.Continuity of quality expertise
 
. Problems may arise if external experts
are retained for a prolonged period. Inevitably, individuals will depart
for various reasons and suitable replacement candidates must be found.
Experts should be selected and appointed according to the needs of the
inspectorate. Political intervention can compromise the quality of indi-
viduals and the value of the group. The inspectorate will, without fail,
be degraded if persons lacking relevant technical expertise are appointed.
The head of the inspectorate should be certain that there is a clear dis-
tinction between experts who provide technical knowledge and staff
who provide political advice.
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3.11.Political relationships with other states
 
. The chairman needs to main-
tain support for the inspectorate’s activities, primarily through transpar-
ency and objectivity. Although the task of an inspection regime may be
operationally defined in terms of a series of straightforward reports on
technical objectives, this represents only part of the work. There is inev-
itably a political aspect to the chairman’s responsibilities involving the
relationship with concerned states, and relationships with these states
must be sustained to retain their confidence in the work of the inspec-
torate. To some extent, public statements and supplemental material
from the agency’s public information officer(s) can support this role.
The choice of political advisors is crucial. Selections should be made fol-
lowing careful consideration of the perspectives that such advisors may
represent as well as their diplomatic and negotiating skills. (Some of the
topics the IAEA has sought to discuss with Iran are not specifically called
for in the Iran IAEA Safeguards agreement. For example, there is no
explicit obligation of Tehran to respond to IAEA queries about sus-
pected military activities connected with its declared civilian nuclear
program. This has been a matter of persuasion by the IAEA.)
 
3.12.Validation
 
. Quality control is required to ensure high standards of pro-
fessionalism and to avoid “group think” biases within the inspection
agency. The structure and management of any inspectorate should have
built-in controls to ensure consistency and adherence to the mandate
and established procedures. Assuring technical and analytical rigor may
be accomplished with an independent body, possibly external, that per-
forms regular reviews or audits of the inspectorate’s work. (Both
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC made use of a college of commissioners to
periodically review the inspectorate’s work.) Ensuring that the inspec-
torate reflects a cultural range of experts from around the world may fur-
ther reinforce credibility. This will also mitigate the risk of some sort of
bias. It is the responsibility of the leadership to see that the process of
assuring quality control is continuously examined.
 
3.13.Existing agencies
 
. A new mandate may overlap or subsume arrange-
ments covered by existing arms control regimes, or have areas of concern
that are similar. (The UNSC Resolution 687 of 1991 on Iraq balanced
the existing nuclear inspection standards of the IAEA with those of the
new UNSCOM inspection organization.) It is important to develop a
cooperative relationship with other relevant agencies to coordinate com-
mon efforts and assure consistent assessments.
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Following the adoption of a mandate, the next task for the inspectorate is to
make an initial implementation plan (which may constitute the first report of
the inspectorate’s head to the commissioning (supervisory) body). The plan
will explain how the mandate will be carried out in practical and adminis-
trative terms. It will also indicate the powers and procedures to be negotiated
as implementation proceeds. In addition, it will indicate requirements for
resources and detail the concept of operations as well as an initial plan for
inspections. This report may simply inform the supervisory body, or may be
used to elicit approval for the planned course of action.
 
4.1. Detailed planning
 
. A small core group of staff to support the chairman
will be necessary as soon as the regime has a mandate. The range of
required skills will include technical and regional expertise as well as finan-
cial, legal, logistical and administrative competence. These will form the
chairman’s initial planning team. Taking the overall objective defined in
the mandate and breaking it down into individual actions for the inspec-
tion process, the team will create detailed inspection plans and define the
target of each activity during the inspection. Planning must cover all
aspects of the inspectorate work as dictated by the nature and extent of the
operation, with particular attention to the safety of the inspectors. Plan-
ning will include: travel, training, medical considerations, logistics,
administration, and analytical, advisory and language services.
 
4.2. Rights and privileges
 
. The effectiveness of the inspectors’ work is
heavily dependent on the rights and privileges they are accorded. They
should have appropriate diplomatic status with the attendant immuni-
ties and responsibilities. There must also be specific rights for inspection
activities including access, freedom of movement, ability to use technical
equipment such as sensors and imagery, and permission to take samples
and employ other inspection techniques. Limits on inspection tech-
niques will reduce the effectiveness of the inspectors and ultimately
affect their ability to achieve the outcome demanded by the mandate.
 
4.3
 
.
 
Concluding subsidiary agreements
 
. Following the initial report, the
process of creating the necessary internal guidelines and covenants with
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the inspected party can begin. As noted above, topics that may require
procedural documents could include: obligations for support to the
inspectorate, access to sites, determination of the status and immunity
of inspectors, protocols for sampling and analysis, overflight procedures
for aircrafts, and procedures for the conduct of inspections.
 
4.4. Organizational structure
 
. The chairman will need to determine the
structure and 
 
modus operandi
 
 of the new inspection body. While his
choices will depend on the specific task(s) and his preferences, there
must be a clear chain of command and reporting. The authority of
inspection team chiefs in the field must be clear, particularly regarding
interaction with representatives of the inspected party. Procedures gov-
erning the flow of information, and the various actions to be taken in the
event of a specific type of incident, must be specified and understood by
the inspectors. Some of these issues may be dealt with during training,
others through developing written protocols.
 
4.5. Staffing
 
.
 
A. Mobilizing resources
 
. As noted above, once a decision has been made to
implement an inspection regime, several key appointments must be made—
notably a leader and core staff. Normal methods of appointing and remuner-
ating staff, obtaining and purchasing equipment, and finding funds to cover
the costs of a new, rapidly expanding and very active organization may be dif-
ficult. Urgency may force the agency to seek fast-track options such as recruit-
ing 
 
gratis
 
 personnel, accepting equipment lent by sympathetic states, or using
facilities and services made available free of charge (for example the United
States provided the services of a U-2 surveillance aircraft to support inspec-
tions in Iraq,). These may be temporary measures, but will inevitably raise
questions about the independence of an agency. The chairman and the officer
in charge of finance and logistics may have to make essential decisions about
resources with respect to both the efficiency and perceived credibility of the
inspection undertaking.
 
B. Leadership
 
. As noted above, the selection of a leader is critical. Allied to
this is the choice of the organizational structure of the inspectorate. A direct
and easily perceptible chain of command must be created, along with clear
definitions of the delegated authority and the responsibilities assigned to each
person in charge. In circumstances where immediate action is required, it is
unlikely that lengthy and elaborate recruitment procedures can be accommo-
dated. Ad hoc hiring or recruiting may be necessary to fill posts quickly. This
may have long-term consequences if it is difficult to replace such staff when
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they prove unable to fulfill the requirements. An alternative source of staff
may be seconded (or 
 
gratis
 
) experts from supporting governments. This too
has consequences, as the professional neutrality of such personnel might be
open to criticism or suspicion. On the other hand, such personnel may be
more readily dismissed if they do not perform or are no longer needed.
 
C. Technical experts
 
. First-rate technical experts may be more difficult to
locate and recruit than administrative and logistical staff. Because of the
unique nature of weapons inspections, qualified and experienced specialists
may be found in limited places, e.g. weapon companies, military units, gov-
ernment services or the ranks of those who have retired from such employ-
ment. The number of candidates may be small and they may be expensive to
employ. Moreover, persuasion may be needed to convince their current
employers to release them. Compounding the problem of scarcity of talent is
the need to seek a balance of experience, skill, age, geography, gender and cul-
tural background. All the above factors contribute importantly to the effec-
tiveness and credibility of the inspectorate.
 
D.Competent inspectors
 
. Talented technical experts are not necessarily tal-
ented inspectors. The process of recruiting and training, even if undertaken
in urgent circumstances, must allow for development of unique inspection
related skills. Ideally, any new inspection regime has the opportunity and the
competence to draw upon experienced personnel who can train the new staff.
(In the longer run, the agency should incorporate possibilities for staff
advancement both professionally and managerially.) In addition to excellent
scientific, engineering or other qualifications, inspectors should have a range
of general skills. These should include: good powers of observation, good
communication ability (both written and orally), able to cope with high levels
of stress, and able to negotiate and work as team players. Candidates must also
be prepared to spend a great deal of time away from their base and be ready
to cope with unexpected circumstances and frequently unpleasant environ-
ments. They must also be physically and medically fit. Finding such people is
challenging. Most candidates will require training to develop and adjust their
skills to apply them to implementing the policies and procedures of an inspec-
tion regime. In summary, a recruitment policy and its implementation system
is a critical element in the success of the regime.
 
4.6. Data management
 
. From the start, it is essential to design and maintain
a data management system. Information is the essence of an inspection
regime and managing that data determines the success of the effort. Data-
base management tools and practices can be emulated from other agen-
cies such as the IAEA or OPCW. There are also advanced commercial
 
0000 101760 GRMAT #163CB74.book  Page 31  Friday, March 30, 2012  4:22 PM
 32 IV. Start Phase and First Report
 
systems in use with direct application to inspection needs. Mistakes in
selecting the data management system will cascade into enormous prob-
lems later. Conversely, this is an area where technology and software are
constantly evolving in ways that can improve inspection and analytic
capabilities. For example, a system could organize data based upon geo-
spatial coordinates and be searchable by the use of conditions such as
names, dates and other terminology. Future inspection tools could easily
be developed using custom applications for smart phones to record stan-
dard formatted data and transmit directly to the headquarters database.
 
4.7. Inspection equipment. The equipment required to conduct inspec-
tions will vary widely. Equipment for sensors, sampling, imagery,
motion and tampering detection can all be brought to the service of the
inspection process. Today this equipment is generally becoming smaller,
sturdier, more accurate, more capable and more durable. Inspection
agencies need to keep their equipment holdings and procedures under
constant review. Occasionally, technology can overtake mandates. An
agency may find that it acquires capabilities in excess of its original man-
date to investigate.
4.8. Communications. Local on-site communications tools during inspec-
tions will be used for safety, command and control, logistical support
and the transfer of data. A local radio network may be established, or
simple cell phones employed, depending upon the local state of affairs
and security needs. Transmission from inspection teams to the head-
quarters office must also be provided. Security, flexibility and data rate
considerations will drive these decisions. Real-time video from the field
can be a useful capability.
4.9. Budget. As noted above, the creators of the inspection system should
ensure sustained funding. Finding sources of funding should be the
responsibility of the supervisory body – especially given the political
implications of donor support if that is used. On the other hand, it is the
inspection body’s responsibility to make projections of resource require-
ments and assure they are continuously updated. Should new techniques
or tactics become necessary (such as purchasing commercial satellite
imagery), the cost implications need to be considered. Moreover, if less
expensive methods are effective, they should be pursued (such as remote
sensors instead of on-site inspections). As with all enterprises, cost-ben-
efit judgments must be made by the supervisory body.
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4.10.Timelines of activities. Detailed planning includes projecting a time-
line to achieve the inspection goals. This schedule should include such
activities as staff hiring, procurement of equipment, deployments, and
reporting. As planning is refined the staff can start to identify other crit-
ical deadlines to be met during the inspection process. In this way, man-
aging an inspection organization is similar to other enterprises.
4.11.Training. No matter how urgent the initial inspection may be, some
training will be necessary. Training can be time consuming depending
upon the background of the recruited inspectors. By deploying experi-
enced personnel, the time needed for initial training may be kept to a
minimum. Decisions are required about who should conduct the train-
ing, where this should be done, and what resources are necessary. Any
delay in obtaining a sufficient number of trained personnel could be
reduced by establishing a mechanism to identify and sustain a cadre of
pre-trained personnel. Independent of any existing inspection system,
there would be great benefit from an international pool or registry of
pre-trained individuals representing a wide range of states, disciplines,
and skills. Such a cadre could be maintained after initial basic training
by regular refresher courses and training exercises. Training on technical
and cultural issues should be followed by team building and investiga-
tion skills development. To date, there is no such registry, and recruit-
ment of experienced inspectors is ad hoc at best. Note: the training
addressed here is not related to weapons design information that could
pose proliferation concerns. Rather, it relates to the specialized skills and
procedures employed during inspections.
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As noted earlier, the inspectors’ basic material is information. The original
information will come from the source of allegation or declaration that led to
the establishment of the inspection regime. Most of the inspectors’ tools will
involve ways of acquiring, analyzing, and storing information from all possi-
ble sources.
5.1. On-Site inspection. Most inspections will involve visits to locations
directly or indirectly involved or suspected to be involved with WMD.
Such visits offer an opportunity to collect samples, interview local staff,
and examine documents and computers as well as to assess many practi-
cal aspects of a program. Planning preparation requires obtaining refer-
ence material such as maps, site diagrams, historical imagery, building
and construction layout, declarations, previous inspection reports and
other relevant background information. From this, objectives are estab-
lished and plans can be developed for inspecting the site. Other factors
include whether advance notice will be given, the amount of translation
and other linguistic support available, the degree of intrusiveness, deal-
ing with site personnel, and how information is to be recorded and evi-
dence collected. Care should be taken to minimize any disruption of
legitimate activities at the site in question. With sites that are not directly
or exclusively involved in a WMD program, such as ‘dual-use sites’,
there is a fine line to be drawn between intrusiveness and the need to
respect confidentiality for legitimate activities. Site visits often involve
some inherent problems. The length of the visit is usually limited, and
gaining access may lead to a confrontation. The presence of experienced
inspectors in these circumstances can help achieve a non-confrontational
and positive outcome. Site visits require a great deal of planning effort,
time, and resources.
5.2. Sampling and analysis. Collecting and analyzing information and mate-
rials (sampling and analysis) requires careful advance preparation. Deci-
sions must be made as to if and when samples should be taken and
whether a distinction is to be drawn between samples taken for forensic/
compliance purposes and those taken for environmental or minor inves-
tigative purposes. Other matters to be considered are the splitting of sam-
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ples either to share with a host or to retain as “controls,” and how to
maintain the chain of custody. The procedures need to be set down in an
agreed upon protocol (as part of guidelines, noted earlier) that takes
account of technical, forensic, and legal requirements. Reference labora-
tories will need to be identified and arrangements made for employing
their services. (It should be noted that transport of particular WMD sam-
ples might not be possible on commercial carriers. This can be a major
complication.) The ability of an inspection regime to handle sampling
and analysis well may provide a strong element of deterrence. It should
be noted that results of sample analysis would be perceived as the most
convincing evidence of the presence or absence of prohibited activities.
5.3. Interviews. The testimony of professionals engaged in WMD-related
jobs in an inspected country represents one of the most fruitful sources
of information about weapons programs. Typical interviewees will
include government officials, military staff, plant managers and workers.
Interviewing such people is among the most difficult and challenging
tasks faced by inspectors. Individuals must be identified and made avail-
able for meeting with inspectors. Modalities must be established for
interviews. Among the details of concern are: who may be present; what
form of recording is acceptable; whether or not the interviews can be
conducted on-site; how to attribute the testimony collected, etc. Proce-
dures will be necessary to request and obtain interviews with specific
named individuals or specific individuals involved in a suspect activity.
This reflects the importance of obtaining bona fide first-hand evidence,
not hearsay. Interviews and associated activities can be highly sensitive
and discretion is necessary.
5.4. Documents and digital media. Inspection teams need to be prepared
to inspect electronic media. Depending upon the access permitted, var-
ious techniques can be used to search for telltales of non-compliance.
Computer forensics and advanced data search is a rapidly evolving field
and inspection applications of such and other new techniques will
require continuous policy review. In principle some inspection activity
can be done remotely if that is within the range of permitted techniques.
5.5. Sensors and tagging. Using remote sensing and tagging can extend the
reach of inspectors. The capabilities of such equipment are constantly
improving. Many physically observable facts can now be measured in
real time and the results passed immediately to monitoring posts. Simi-
larly, equipment, containers, stores and even buildings can be tagged
with tamper-indicating seals, and closed circuit TV or other sensors can
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monitor such seals remotely. All of these measures can help inspectors to
become more confident concerning the level of activity at a site. The role
of such techniques will grow as technologies improve. They can reduce,
but not eliminate, the need for on-site inspections.
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Inspections take many forms, and may be classified in various ways. It is
important to acknowledge that however they are defined, inspections are
attempts to either collect information, or carry out specific actions like weap-
ons destruction -- or both. As noted above, for some inspections, inspectors may
be welcomed by a fully cooperative state and given the access they request. For
other inspections, the process may be coercively imposed on the inspected party,
and the inspectors will confront obstruction and hostility.
6.1. Inspection process. The inspection activity may commence with on-site
investigations seeking baseline information about the nature and extent
of weapons programs. Such inspections can be wide-ranging and intru-
sive. Their aim is to survey the WMD infrastructure under investigation
in sufficient detail to provide the supervisory body with the information
to make decisions regarding future weapons inspection programs. Later
in the process, more specialized types of on-site inspections may be
required in order to implement further monitoring or inspection mea-
sures. Whether or not they are needed will depend on the specific issues
raised; such activities might include destruction (for example, inspectors
have been called upon to destroy chemical weapons in Libya, Iraq, and
other locations); investigation (such as accounting for claims about the
civil vs. military applications of certain laboratories); or monitoring (at
declared sites such as nuclear reactors). Consideration must be given to
other means of collecting information, such as by helicopters, remotely
piloted vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft and satellites. To support a compli-
ance mechanism, carefully prescribed routines or monitoring protocols
may be implemented to detect indicators suggesting non-compliance.
6.2. Inspection types. Inspections may also be categorized according to their
subject type or objectives: a biological weapons inspection is different in
content and execution from a nuclear inspection. It may also be appro-
priate to use a multidisciplinary approach in case facilities with multiple
potential applications (e.g. industrial facilities that could be applied to
nuclear or chemical weapons purposes) are to be inspected for illicit
activity. A multidisciplinary approach can be particularly useful when
the subject of the inspection regime is defined broadly with respect to
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proscribed activity. The categorization of the desired inspection activity
must be consistent with the overarching mandate. The nomenclature is
politically sensitive. Practical inspection procedures should be flexible
enough to be configured in ways suitable to obtain the information
needed. Events in the field may force teams to reconfigure their mode of
operation in order to meet an immediate requirement.
6.3. Inspection sites. Inspection sites may be categorized in several ways.
Sites that are identified by the inspected state and notified to inspectors
are usually termed “declared sites.” However, inspectors may wish to
inspect sites that have not been declared. Countries have sites that are
sensitive for reasons unrelated to WMD and they may not accept inter-
national inspectors to locations of national importance. Such inspec-
tions give rise to many issues, especially if the site in question has a pri-
mary function that is not related to WMD, but that is deemed sensitive
by the inspected state. The procedures for inspecting a “declared” site
will therefore be different from that of an “undeclared” site. In both
cases modalities will need to be established.
6.4. Designation of and access to sites. It is necessary to have procedures for
designating a site for inspection. These will include defining the site in
terms of location and perimeter. Sites may be designated for inspection
according to predetermined qualities such as geographic location, func-
tion, or administrative affiliation. Inspectors may mark boundaries on
maps or on aerial photographs to specify the precise limits. Procedures for
gaining access to the site and to buildings and areas within the site must
be agreed or accepted by the inspected country as well. For example, who
must be informed? What is a reasonable amount of time to allow for gain-
ing access? What will be the procedure if access is not granted?
6.5. Inspection notification. Inspections may be carried out with different
degrees of warning or notification. A snap decision to make an inspec-
tion with no prior notice may be merited by unanticipated but signifi-
cant information. Most inspection activity, however, will involve a
period of prior notice. Lead times are dictated by administrative and
logistical requirements rather than by operational factors. “No-notice”
inspections have advantages with respect to confidence building (the
sites are less likely to be “cleansed” of potentially incriminating evidence)
but they may cause friction with the 1inspected party. Much will depend
upon the scope and intent of the mandate.
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6.6. Inspection teams. Inspection teams might be of various compositions
depending on the nature of the inspection. Some team members may be
experts in specific types or aspects of the WMD under investigation.
Others may possess general technical skills, and yet others will have more
commonplace skills such as communication, report writing, logistics,
navigation and safety. As noted above, there should be a diversity of
nationality, gender, age and cultural background. Additionally, there
needs to be a breadth of experience to provide continuity. In all cases,
success depends upon having a capable, experienced chief inspector in
the field. Without good leadership, a team can be ineffective and com-
mit significant mistakes. Good inspection team leaders take time to
develop. They may come from the pool of inspectors who have previous
experience—perhaps in other inspection regimes. Finally, it is important
to note that the term inspector can be applied to a wide range of indi-
viduals, from those with a single experience in a single country, to those
with a career of relevant work. The inspectorate can mix experienced and
inexperienced personnel to build a capable team. A team can benefit
from novel perspectives with new inspectors.
6.7. Language. It is unlikely that all personnel will possess a common language.
The provision of translation and deeper linguistic skills should be woven
into all levels of operations. Also, interpreters in the field will need under-
standing of technical and specialized terms to be able to convey relevant
information. Consideration must also be given to the translation of other
pertinent expert-related information encountered during inspections.
6.8. Day-to-day operation. Conducting inspections must be coordinated
between the headquarters and the inspection teams in the field. Opera-
tions in the field involve a range of challenging factors beyond the basic
inspection objectives: liaison with the inspected party or local officials
and population, the need to understand and respect local customs and
culture, understanding of the political climate of the country/site subject
to inspection, and finally a resolution of the frequent problem of time
zone differences between headquarters and teams in the field.
6.9. Reporting. The entire inspection process may be viewed as a means of
producing a report to the commissioning body. No matter how insight-
ful the inspection activity may be, the value of all efforts stands or falls
by the quality of the reporting. The procedures developed must ensure
a clear separation between reporting of facts and expressions of opinion
or comment.
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6.10.Reporting process. Measures must be taken to ensure a consistent
reporting process. There should be standard formats to facilitate data-
base entry and ensure that material is searchable and understandable,
now and in the future. Reporting may include the handling and storage
of physical material such as documents, photographs, technical samples,
and even large equipment. However, for the most part, pertinent infor-
mation is in digital format. (It should be noted that the OPCW has
adopted ISO standards for documentation.) Reporting from the field
can include a variety of types: daily status reports covering housekeeping
and maintenance affairs, regular compliance or monitoring assessments,
and, in the case of specialized inspection teams, final inspection summa-
ries. Reports will eventually form the historical archive and should be
written with that in mind.
6.11.Reporting policy. The reporting procedures must specify principles for
the collection and handling of information and material, as well as for
how it will be analyzed, assessed, and reported. Policies also need to be
developed to cover the extent to which the collected information will be
shared. Procedures must cover what already is collected, what should be
collected, and what seems to be difficult if not impossible to collect.
6.12.Analysis and assessment. This is a crucial phase of the inspection pro-
cess and may take place under great pressure. Technical discussions
among team members may be energetic and disagreements are normal.
It is vital to have steady and firm leadership that can maintain the integ-
rity and well-being of the inspection team and enable the results to be
produced as quickly as possible because the demand for findings in the
form of a report must be accomplished. Advance consideration of pro-
cedures for dealing with minority opinions in teams can be useful. The
responsibility for the content of the report must be determined in
advance. It may lie solely with the chief inspector or with the team as a
whole. The division of responsibility, between the inspectorate’s head
and the supervisory body, for assessment and analysis must be clear (as
highlighted in Section 2.7).
6.13.Dissemination. Once the system of inspection reporting has been
established, various subsidiary tasks will remain. In order to make mate-
rial accessible to a range of readers, it is essential to identify staff that can
interpret technical material and produce reports that are readily under-
stood by a non-specialist audience.
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6.14.Credibility. The reporting by the chairman to the supervisory body
must be credible. Reporting must be as open and comprehensive as pos-
sible. Whatever the nature of the information collected, it must be
assessed for veracity. High standards must be sustained to discriminate
between facts and things that have yet to be proven. Ultimately, the stan-
dards applied may affect whether assessments on compliance can be
made. This is a fundamental issue and needs to be addressed by the head
of the inspection agency (as noted above in Section 2.3 Non-compli-
ance, and Section 2.6 Burden of Proof). It is essential to specify the
method of reviewing such assessments – for example, peer review within
an agency, or audit by a panel of external experts.
6.15.Archiving information. Inspection organizations will face growing
quantities of data. Information will be collected and stored from its first
day of operation. This growing archive will serve as one of the most valu-
able resources for both inspectors and headquarters decision-makers
alike. Moreover, historians and academics may at some point seek access
to the records. At an early stage, policies should be developed to clearly
specify the procedures for determining what is to be kept, who has
access, and who is to be responsible for handling, watching and manag-
ing the material.
6.16.Public relations. Public relations are a vital aspect of any inspection
regime. The public statements of such bodies are as much part of their
day-to-day function as inspections are. Depending upon the desires of
the supervisory body, the inspectorate head may sustain a public rela-
tions posture that promotes understanding of the inspectorate’s mission
and activities. This will aid in the event that it is necessary to explain or
defend difficult situations or errors.
6.17.Safety. The safety of inspectors is paramount. Most WMD-related
inspections are bound to face hazards from the dangerous materials that
are the subject of inspection or simply present at military and industrial
facilities. Due to the very nature of some inspection activities, such haz-
ards are difficult to foresee. The best precaution is to use experienced,
well-equipped and well-trained personnel whose operations are gov-
erned by realistic, clearly defined procedures, in line with internationally
accepted scientific and industrial norms. Safety training must be con-
ducted, both initially and periodically, to inculcate and maintain appro-
priate safety standards among inspectors. The inspection agency must
work to its own standards, not those of the host state. This may lead to
clashes concerning safe working conditions, which will have to be settled
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by careful consultation. The creation and validation of items such as
procedural manuals takes time and effort. In the interests of standardiza-
tion, attempts should be made to adopt tried and tested material from
comparable bodies. Not to be under-estimated are the health challenges
caused by stress, unaccustomed food and lifestyle, adjustment to a dif-
ferent climate, endemic disease, and at times employment in dangerous
or poorly maintained facilities. Furthermore, it is important to retain
records of an inspector’s health and inspection activities. Such data may
be valuable to determine if subsequent inspector health issues are related
to previous inspection activity exposures.
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VII. Ending Inspection Regimes
7.1. Hiatus or termination. From its inception, an inspection regime must
plan to deal with interruptions to its work and, ultimately, its termina-
tion. This may occur because the objective has been achieved, because a
mandate has expired, because the process has been overtaken by events,
or because of inadequate political support. It may also be triggered by
violations or non-compliance. Each eventuality will require a different
response. There must be a clear understanding as to whom, or which
body, makes the appropriate decisions.
7.2. Legacy. When it has been decided to end the inspection regime and
close down its headquarters and support, there is much to be done. Plans
need to be in place to deal with staff, archives, website, hardware, final
reporting and the like. Some inspection related materiel may require
retention for legal reasons but may have to be kept confidential. Items
may have sufficient academic, historic, scientific significance to warrant
their retention in international collections. Establishing an archive will
require careful planning and execution.
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